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Introduction
International cooperation is a prerequisite for the attainment of an efficient outcome in the presence of global public goods. However, international negotiations suffer from divergent national interests, different conceptions of fair burden or effort sharing, and a lack of trust between the negotiating countries. Such obstacles are regularly observed in negotiations on quite different topics such as international trade agreements, regulation of financial markets, development aid and international environmental protection.
A prominent example of the limited success of international negotiations is climate change policy. Negotiators have been unable to achieve a global agreement following the Kyoto Protocol. A grand coalition that credibly commits all polluting parties to domestic emission reductions is out of sight. As a precursor of a global agreement to be reached by 2020 only a rather informal 'road map' has been agreed upon at the Conference of Parties in Durban in 2011. In practice, rather than trying to achieve the ideal 'grand coalition', it seems more reasonable to strive for partial international agreements amongst some subgroup of likeminded countries, as e.g. the EU member countries.
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In this paper we analyze the outcomes of international cooperation in the provision of a global public good like climate protection in which the set of countries participating in an international environmental agreement is of only limited extent. Buchholz, Haslbeck and Sandler (1998) have shown that -due to the offsetting behavior of the outsiders -the incentives to cooperate and to form a coalition might be very weak when the group of 'willing' countries is of limited size. In contrast, Vicary (2012) recently has found conditions under which a small group of agents can gain from unilaterally forming a coalition. Neither paper, however, makes reference to explicit equilibrium concepts that permit inferring the optimal design of collective action within some cooperating coalition. In this paper, our treatment of this question links the partial cooperation issue with the matching approach that has gained considerable attention in public theory.
Matching mechanisms through which agents subsidize the public good contributions of other agents were first suggested by Guttman (1978 Guttman ( , 1987 . They can be seen as a way to exploit the principle of reciprocity to improve efficiency of public good allocation. This ap-proach has been refined in various ways and applied to many national and international public goods by Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) , Danziger and Schnytzer (1991) , Althammer and Buchholz (1993) , Varian (1994) , Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996), Falkinger (1996) , Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997) , Falkinger and Brunner (1999) , and Rübbelke (2011, 2012) . Barrett (1990 ), Falkinger, Hackl and Pruckner (1996 ), Rübbelke (2006 , and Tremblay (2007, 2011) have applied matching particularly in the context of global environmental protection. In contrast to the standard literature on matching, our model allows matching rates also to become negative, i.e. the public good provision of a coalition is penalized via matching within this group of countries. Practically, this can be accomplished by introducing a subsidy on fossil fuel use which will trigger higher levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
Our analysis of matching as the instrument of partial cooperation applies the Aggregative Game Approach developed by Hartley (2003, 2007) , which provides a very convenient tool in the search for equilibrium outcomes in this context. In particular, we use this approach to complement the literature on coalition formation (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 , Barrett 1994 , Hoel 1992 , Hoel and Schneider 1997 , and Finus, Altamirano-Cabrera and van Ierland 2005 . However, we focus more on the profitability of coalitions and less on its stability.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents our model in which there are two different groups of countries. One is a coalition of like-minded cooperating countries whose members are mutually matching their public good provision, and the other consists of outsiders which -without any matching -act non-cooperatively playing Nash against the coalition. Section 3 applies the Aggregative Game Approach to determine interior Nash equilibria in which all countries make a strictly positive contribution to the public good and explores the conditions under which the coalition has an incentive to increase or decrease its matching rate. Section 4 considers corner solutions in which one of the two groups of countries does not make a positive contribution to the public good. Those corner solutions have to be taken into account if one wants to determine the matching coalition´s strategically optimal choice of its matching rate and thus to find the subgame-perfect equilibria of the two stage game in which the matching rate is chosen at stage 1 and a conventional Nash game in public good contributions is being played at stage 2. In this section, as throughout the whole paper, we 4 do not only provide a general analysis of such subgame-perfect equilibria but also illustrate the major results by a simple Cobb-Douglas example. As a specific -and rather unexpectedresult we show that partial cooperation of a rather small number of countries may reduce public good supply and thus may be harmful for global environmental quality. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider the standard public good economy of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and Cornes and Sandler (1986) which we apply to the case of a global public good. There are n identical countries which all have the same utility function ( , ) i u x G and the same private good endowment ('income') w . By i x we denote private consumption in country 1,..., i n  and G is the quantity of a global public good (i.e., 'climate protection'). The utility function has the usual properties, i.e. it is strictly monotone increasing and twice continuously differentiable in both arguments, and both the private and the public good are assumed to be non-inferior. The technically given marginal rate of transformation between the public and the private good and thus the marginal costs of greenhouse gas abatement are assumed to be constant and can therefore be normalized to one. Then, the aggregate budget constraint comprising the incomes of all n countries reads
The essential assumption of our analysis now is that the whole world is divided into two groups: One subgroup, the coalition K, consists of 2 k  cooperating countries which jointly provide the public good through reciprocally matching their public good contributions. The applied matching mechanism is a symmetric one. We denote by  the matching rate by which the public good contribution i g of each country is augmented by the members of this group. This means that the flat contribution i g made by any country i K  induces In contrast to most of the matching literature we also allow for the possibility of a negative matching rate 0   in our model. In this case national public good contributions are not 5 subsidized but taxed or penalized. In the case of climate protection such a penalty might consist in fossil-fuel support policies, like, e.g., a subsidization of fossil fuel inputs, causing additional greenhouse gas emissions. In OECD countries, among the public fossil-fuel support policies are "direct subsidies, intervention in markets in ways that affect costs or prices, assumption of a part of companies' financial risks, tax reductions or exemptions, and undercharging for the use of government-supplied goods, services or assets" (OECDb 2011: 3).
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Matching implies that country is confronted with the effective public good price  , where
Clearly, if 0 0 , then 1 1 . We can equivalently choose  or  as the variable on which the outcomes produced by matching schemes depend. To facilitate the exposition, we will use the effective public good price  that is induced by the matching mechanism for each country in K throughout the paper and will call it matching parameter.
The other subgroup M of non-cooperating outsiders consists of 1 countries which all individually play Nash against the coalition K. Their effective public good price is the technically given marginal rate of transformation between the public and the private good which has been assumed to be 1.
Interior Matching Equilibria
We now apply the Aggregative Game Approach (see Hartley 2003, 2007) in order to determine public good supply ˆ( ) G  at an interior Nash equilibrium when there is partial matching within the coalition K . Under the matching scheme, the effective public good price for the coalition members is  .
Given preferences ( , )
i u x G let ( , ) e G  denote the income expansion path of any country when the effective public good price for this country is  . Public good supply ˆ( ) G  at an interior matching equilibrium, in which all countries in K and M make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good, is then characterized by a special version of the aggregate budget constraint (1) 
Condition ( In an interior matching equilibrium private consumption is
For 1   , eq. (3) characterizes the standard Nash equilibrium with voluntary public good provision. In the subsequent section we will infer for which matching parameters ( 
Proof: Both (i) and (ii) follow from the fact that ( , )
e G  is increasing in  for any level of G .
As a next step we analyze how utility ( ):
( ( ), ( ))
of a member of the cooperating coalition in an interior matching equilibrium is changed by a marginal variation of the matching parameter  . To facilitate notation we adopt the following abbreviations:
For the marginal effect of a variation of the matching parameter on the utility we then get
at an interior matching equilibrium, 3 and that (3) implies
it follows from (4) that
An immediate implication of condition (6) (ii) If in an interior solution a local maximum for the utility of the countries in K is attained for some matching parameter   then
We illustrate this and several other results using the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, i.e.
( , )
  indicates the preference intensity for the private in relation to that for the public good. Then, given any public good price  , the income expansion path
In this special case Proposition 2 reads as follows:
(i) A small positive matching rate is preferable for coalition K if and only if
(ii) If in an interior solution a local maximum for the utility of the countries in K is attained for some matching parameter   then
Proof: From (8) it directly follows that 1 ( ) M e    holds for all  , which gives (i).
QED
The interpretation of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 is as follows: A large (small) cooperating coalition K , a small (large) group of outsiders M and a relatively strong (weak) preference for the global public good, i.e.  is small (large), favours positive (negative) matching within group K . Consequently, moderate matching increases (reduces) public good supply as compared to the standard private provision equilibrium.
Propositions 2 and 3 reflect the basic result of Buchholz, Haslbeck and Sandler (1998) in the matching context. However, a problem is that the marginal analysis only pertains to small changes of  which preserve interiority of the matching equilibrium (see also Vicary 2012).
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
We now consider the two-stage game in which the members of the coalition cooperatively determine the matching rate at stage 1 and there is a non-cooperative Nash game between the coalition as a whole and the outsiders at stage 2. Then it is possible that corner solutions occur as subgame-perfect equilibria. In such a case either the outsiders or the coalition members would make zero contributions to the global public good. We now, in a first step, describe at a general level how subgame-perfect equilibria are to be determined when corner solutions are taken into account. In a second step we illustrate this procedure for the Cobb-Douglas case.
General Analysis
To determine the ranges of  for which either interior or corner solutions result, we define two threshold levels  and  for the matching parameter  by letting
This definition means that in an interior matching equilibrium as defined by (3) 
which, by letting 0 m  , represents a special case of (3). For private consumption then ( ) ( ( ), ) 
(ii) If    , then only the outsiders in group M contribute to the global public good in the unique matching equilibrium and ( )
, then the unique matching equilibrium is interior and ( ) ( ) This implies that given  the coalition K makes a higher contribution to the public good than in the case of  so that the aggregate budget constraint (1) would be violated.
(ii) The proof is analogous to that of part (i). then Proposition 5 says that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium the coalition definitely will choose a positive matching rate and will make higher contributions to the public good than in the stage 2 Nash equilibrium without matching. But as seen from Proposition 6 this is also a possibility if 1    , i.e. if the marginally negative matching would be in the interest of coalition K . Proposition 6 also shows that under certain circumstances the coalition might prefer negative matching as its strategically optimal choice. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium then both public good supply and utility of the outsiders are lower than in the Nash equilibrium without matching. Therefore, in this case partial cooperation within coalition K can be deemed harmful which reminds us of a paradoxical result described by Hoel (1991) 
Proof
The Example of Cobb-Douglas Preferences
Applying condition (11) to the Cobb-Douglas example where ( , )
To simplify the treatment of the Cobb-Douglas case we make the empirically plausible assumption that 1   , i.e. that the agents do not value the public good higher than the private good. Then clearly 1 k   . Furthermore we recall from Proposition 3 that 1
Then we obtain the following special version of Proposition 5. 
Proof: Proposition 5 can be applied since SP is fulfilled in the Cobb-Douglas case (see Appendix A2). Part (i) then follows as it is easily calculated that  
The other condition stated in (i) is equivalent to
The calculation of the relevant utility levels is given in Appendix A1. Part (ii) follows from   and m is given, an interior solution could at most be obtained for a single natural number k . But then, moreover, it follows from the interiority constraint that we have
  . Therefore, the interior outcome can make the coalition members only better off if the number of outsiders does not exceed 2 .
Therefore, the standard outcome in the case 1 k m   will be the optimal standalone allocation for coalition K where  applied the Aggregative Game Approach to characterize matching equilibria in flat contributions. Thereby we linked the theory of coalition formation with some recent developments in public good theory.
 explored the coalition´s optimal strategy for setting the matching rate at a first stage, paying special attention to corner solutions at the second stage where either the outsiders or the coalition members do not contribute to the public good.
In particular we have shown that the two types of corner solution are of a very different quality. If only the coalition contributes to the public good, then partial cooperation generates a Pareto improvement as compared to the standard voluntary provision equilibrium:
Public good supply and utility of all countries are increased. If, however, only the outsiders contribute, then partial cooperation has harmful effects: Although the utility of coalition members is increased, public good supply and utility of the outsiders fall. In the context of global warming, the coalition lowers its public good contribution (by increasing greenhouse gas emission through subsidization of fossil fuels) as compared to the Nash equilibrium without matching in order to induce the outsiders to increase their contributions. A further result of our analysis has been that, depending on the specific circumstances, it is well possible that the cooperating coalition's strategically optimal choice of the matching parameter at the first stage of the game steers the economy into either of these two corner solutions.
Harmful partial cooperation thus may occur in the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In the Cobb-Douglas example, moreover, it is precisely the presence of a small coalition that generates the unfavourable outcome. This might provide an additional reason why, even if pragmatic reasons motivate a particular interest in partial cooperation among a small number of countries, it is still important to understand the possibilities afforded by larger coalitions. It is solely large coalitions which definitely avoid the harmful effects of cooperation and ensure a Pareto improvement over the standard voluntary provision equilibrium.
